



Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Down, K. and Hutchinson, M. (2015) 'Bitcoin will bite the dust.', Cato journal., 35 (2). pp. 357-382.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/springsummer-2015
Publisher's copyright statement:
Copyright c© Cato Institute. All rights reserved.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
357
Bitcoin Will Bite the Dust
Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson
Bitcoin is the most radical innovation in the monetary space for a
very long time. It is an entirely private monetary system that runs
itself and does not depend on trust in any central authority to honor
its promises. Instead, it relies on trust in the Bitcoin community or
network that verifies transactions and maintains the integrity of the
system. This system of distributed trust creates bitcoins and produces
an automatic, tamper-proof bitcoin money supply process. 1 As such,
it avoids the dangers of discretionary monetary policy—namely,
quantitative easing, manipulated interest rates, and the need to rely
on wise men or women to withstand political pressure or successfully
forecast the future. Indeed, under Bitcoin there is no monetary pol-
icy at all. There is just an automatic monetary rule dictated by the
Bitcoin protocol designed in 2009 by an anonymous programmer
using the alias Satoshi Nakamoto.
Cato Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2015). Copyright © Cato Institute.
All rights reserved.
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1By convention, Bitcoin with an upper case “B” refers to the Bitcoin protocol that
sends and receives payment information; and bitcoin with a lower case “b” refers
to the corresponding unit of money.
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Bitcoin has been widely hailed as a success and has won a sub-
stantial following. Unfortunately, the underlying economics of
Bitcoin mean that it is unsustainable and in all likelihood will be
remembered as a failed experiment—at best a pointer to some
superior successor.
A first-pass intuition into Bitcoin can be obtained from a compar-
ison with the stone money in Milton Friedman’s (1992) case study,
“The Island of Stone Money.” In this story, the people of the island
of Yap in Micronesia used as money large round limestone disks
transported from the nearby island of Palau. These were too heavy to
conveniently move around, so they were placed in prominent places.
When ownership was to be transferred (e.g., as part of a dowry,
inheritance, or ransom payment), the current owner would publicly
announce the change in ownership but the stone would typically
remain where it was and the islanders would maintain a collective
memory of the ownership history of the stones. This collective mem-
ory ensured that there was no dispute over who owned which stones.
Similarly, in Bitcoin, the record of all transactions, the “blockchain,”
is also public knowledge and is regarded as the definitive record of
who owns which bitcoins. Both the stone money and Bitcoin share a
critical feature that is highly unusual for a monetary system: both sys-
tems operate via a decentralized collective memory.
On February 11, 2009, Nakamoto gave an explanation of the
thinking behind Bitcoin in an e-mail announcing its launch: “The root
problem with conventional currency is all the trust that is required to
make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the
currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that
trust. . . . With e-currency based on cryptographic proof, without the
need to trust a third-party middleman, money can be secure and
transactions complete.” Cryptocurrencies, however, face the prob-
lem of “double-spending.” As Nakamoto notes, “Any owner could try
to re-spend an already spent coin by [digitally] signing it again to
another owner. The usual solution is for a trusted company with a
central database to check for double-spending, but that just gets back
to the trust model. . . . Bitcoin’s solution is to use a peer-to-peer net-
work to check for double-spending.” Consequently, “the result is a
distributed system with no single point of failure.”2
2Quoted from http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/forum/topics/bitcoin-open-source.
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The fact that Bitcoin has no single point of failure is highly
significant: it means that it cannot be brought down by knocking out
any particular individual or organization.3 It can only be brought
down by knocking out the whole network or one of the underlying
building blocks on which the network depends.4 It can and does
operate outside of government control: Bitcoin is a dream come true
for anarchists, criminals, and proponents of private money.
Despite its success, the Bitcoin system is unsustainable due to a
design flaw at the very heart of the system. The problem is that
Bitcoin requires competition on the part of “bitcoin miners” who val-
idate transactions blocks, but this competition is unsustainable in the
long run because of economies of scale in the mining industry.
Indeed, these economies of scale are so large that the bitcoin mining
industry is a natural monopoly. Furthermore, there are signs that
competition in this industry is already breaking down. Once that hap-
pens, the system will no longer be able to function as it hitherto has.
Its key attractions (decentralization, absence of a single point of fail-
ure, and anonymity) will disappear; there will no longer be any rea-
son for users to stay with it; and the system will collapse.
How Bitcoin Works
Let’s start by explaining how Bitcoin works.5 The first point to
appreciate is that the system is based on the use of Public-Key
Encryption (PKE) used to digitally authenticate a signature. PKE is
the basis of Internet financial security and is widely used to protect
sensitive financial information. Each individual user has both a pub-
lic key, known to everyone, and a private key, known only to it. When
Alice transfers a bitcoin to Bob, she adds Bob’s public key to the coin
and digitally signs the coin using her private key. When Bob receives
3By contrast, all other successful monetary or payments systems, including private
ones, are dependent on a single individual or organization, which then represents
a potential point of failure. Two well-known examples are the Liberty Dollar and
e-gold, both of which were perfectly respectable (and legal) business enterprises
that were highly successful until they were shut down by the U.S. government.
For more on these cases, see Dowd (2014) and White (2014).
4The two most obvious such pillars are the Internet and the encryption technol-
ogy on which Bitcoin depends. Trying to bring Bitcoin down is therefore a tall
order.
5This account of how Bitcoin works draws extensively from Nielsen (2013).
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the bitcoin, he is able to verify that only someone with Alice’s private
key could have sent it to him: he can then be confident that the bit-
coin came from her.6
There is, however, a problem: how to prevent Alice double-
spending the same bitcoin. So let’s look at the general problem of
Alice making a payment to Bob: there needs to be a transfer and the
transfer needs to be validated without allowing Alice to double-
spend. With conventional cash, the transfer is easy: Alice hands over
a $1 note to Bob and Bob just needs to check that the note is not a
fake. Alice is unable to spend the same dollar note twice: having
handed over the note to Bob, she can’t then spend it again with
Charlie. With a conventional bank check, Alice sends the check to
Bob, and the central authority (the bank) verifies the transfer and
adjusts Alice’s account to prevent her spending the same deposit
money twice. Under the Bitcoin system, on the other hand, there is
no central authority to validate the transfer and prevent Alice double-
spending the same bitcoin. Instead, these tasks are performed by the
network itself—that is, by the community of users.
To get the system to perform these tasks we then have to ensure
that there is a reliable verification process and we have to incentivize
that process. At first sight, the most obvious verification approach
would be a voting system: other users could vote on whether the
transfer was valid. If the majority agreed, then the transfer would be
deemed valid. Unfortunately, this approach does not work.
Remember that the users are anonymous and all we really have is
user IDs. So Alice can set up a billion different IDs and take over the
system: she has one bitcoin, which she then spends with Bob,
Charlie, David, and so on, and she uses her billion votes to approve
each transaction; she sock-puppets the system by overwhelming it
with spam votes, known in the trade as a “Sybil attack.” The way
round this problem is to make each “vote” costly, and this costliness
is achieved by imposing a proof-of-work requirement. In the Bitcoin
system, the proof of work is to demonstrate that the user/voter has
expended valuable CPU power to solve a difficult mathematical
problem. To oversimplify slightly, the veracity of any transaction is
then determined by the majority of CPU-adjusted votes. It is now no
longer economic for Alice to spam the system.
6The principles of PKE were first publicly set out by Diffie and Hellman (1976)
and the first PKE algorithm was set out by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (1978).
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In addition to solving the double-spending problem, Bitcoin must
address the incentive problem—namely, the need to incentivize the
network to validate any transaction. Users need to be given some
reward for spending their valuable CPU power to validate other
people’s transactions. Under the Bitcoin system, this reward comes
from a combination of newly minted bitcoins and a transaction fee.
Leaving aside the fee, the analogy here is with a gold miner mining
for gold and occasionally finding it. Similarly, the Bitcoin validator
goes searching for bitcoins and occasionally gets lucky. For this rea-
son, the process of validating the bitcoin transactions blocks is usually
referred to as “bitcoin mining.” In the very early Bitcoin system, a
successful bitcoin miner was rewarded with 50 bitcoins for each
block validated. However, after every 210,000 validated blocks the
rewards halve. This halving has occurred once so far, in November
2012, so the current reward for validating a block is 25 bitcoins. This
halving will continue roughly every four years so the production of
new bitcoins over time will asymptotically go to zero. It is anticipated
that the rate of bitcoin production per block will fall to less than
1 satoshi, or 0.00000001 BTC, by 2141. By that point, the total
amount of bitcoin produced will be just short of 21million. Note, too,
that because the time to validate each block is fairly predictable
(i.e., about 10 minutes), and even this randomness tends to cancel
out over the long run thanks to the law of large numbers, then the
rate of bitcoin production, and the hence the total mined by any
future time, is highly predictable.
The actual amount of bitcoin available to use, however, is
unknown, because of the risk of permanent loss. Loss of the pri-
vate key to a bitcoin wallet results in the permanent loss of the bit-
coins in that wallet, for example. Bitcoins can also be lost when
hard drives fail or become infected and the user has not backed
them up. One early bitcoiner was reported to have had three
copies of his bitcoin wallet, but inadvertently managed to erase
two of them and then lost his password for the third, in the process
losing $140,000 worth of bitcoin value. There are probably many
others like him. Bitcoins can also be lost due to sundry other forms
of human error. In one widely publicized case (reported, e.g., in
ITN 2013), an IT worker in Wales generated 7,500 bitcoins on a
website in 2009. He then forgot all about them and later threw out
his hard drive in a clear-out. By the time he realized his mistake,
his bitcoins were worth about £4.6 million but were still on his
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hard drive, which was now buried in a landfill in Newport. He was
now a virtual millionaire in more ways than one. He went over to
the site, which was now the size of a football field, and was told
that his hard drive was probably buried 3–5 feet beneath the sur-
face somewhere on the site. He subsequently spent a few weeks
digging around for it, but to no avail, and the local council has
since barred anyone else from looking for it. There are no hard
estimates of how many bitcoins have been permanently lost in
such ways.
An important principle of the Bitcoin system is that it does not
assume that all miners are honest when validating transactions. To
deal with possible dishonesty, it seeks to establish incentive-
compatibility to reward honest miners and make dishonest mining
unworthwhile. To understand how this works, we can think of the
mining process as a competition to approve transactions, and the cost
of entry to this competition is a certain amount of CPU power. A
miner’s chance of success in the next competition is then roughly
equal to the proportion of total computing power that it controls, so
a miner with 1 percent of the computing power being used to vali-
date transactions has a roughly 1 percent chance of winning the com-
petition. It then follows that, provided a lot of computing power is
being brought to bear on the competition, and provided that most
miners are honest, a dishonest miner is likely to have only a small
chance to corrupt the validation process, unless it expends a huge
amount of computing resources—and that will be costly. The idea
(hope?) is then that dishonest mining will rarely occur, for the simple
reason that it is not a profitable strategy.
To spell out the argument further, we need to consider how the
blockchain works. For the system to work properly, we need the net-
work to agree on the order in which transactions occurred, as other-
wise it may not be clear who owns which bitcoins. To achieve this
objective, each block in the blockchain includes a pointer to the pre-
vious block (in fact, this pointer is just a hash of the previous block)
until we go back to the original block, the Genesis block, and we end
up with a linear blockchain.
Sometimes, however, a fork will appear on the chain. This might
happen if two miners happen to validate different blocks at almost
the same time, both broadcast their newly validated blocks to the net-
work, and some network members update the blockchain using one
block, while others update it using the other block. This fork can
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cause confusion, as it is no longer clear which set of transactions is to
be regarded as valid. To get around this problem, the Bitcoin proto-
col stipulates that if a fork occurs, miners should keep track of both
forks, but at any point in time, they should only work on the longer
one. This rule means that once one fork gets a sufficient lead over the
other, then it will become the generally accepted one and the
blockchain will revert to the linear form.7 However, any pending
legitimate transactions in the abandoned fork will eventually be vali-
dated in the successful fork, so all legitimate transactions will still be
validated regardless of the fork in which they first appeared.
One can then imagine Alice attempting a variety of different dou-
ble-spend attacks. One is for her to attempt to validate a block that
includes a first spend with Bob and then a double-spend with
Charlie. But even if she gets lucky and is able to validate her block—
and the odds are that she won’t—the attack won’t work because
other users will refuse to confirm her validation. A second possible
attack is to spend the same bitcoin with Bob and Charlie, but broad-
cast each transaction to different parts of the network in the hope
that both transactions will be confirmed. However, this won’t work
either, as the network will eventually confirm only one transaction. A
third strategy is to spend a bitcoin with Charlie, wait for the transac-
tion to be fully confirmed, and then pretend to be Bob and spend it
on him. To do this, Alice creates a new fork, but her new fork is
already six confirmations behind the leading fork. She then faces the
problem of how to overtake the leading fork, but to do that she would
have to win the competition to validate at least the next six blocks. If
she has 1 percent of the network’s computing power, the probability
of her winning the next seven block validations is then 1/100ˆ7 W
0.0000000000001 percent. So her chances of success are vanishingly
small—she may as well be honest instead.
This discussion is neither rigorous nor exhaustive, but it does
illustrate how the Bitcoin system is designed to counter dishonest
behavior by being incentive-compatible. How well it achieves this
objective is however another matter, and we shall return to this
issue presently.
7In fact, under the Bitcoin protocol, a transaction is not considered confirmed
unless it is part of the longest fork and at least five later blocks follow it in that




Why Bitcoin Mining Is a Natural Monopoly
As we have seen, a central feature of the Bitcoin system is that it
relies on competition between independent miners to maintain the
integrity of the blockchain: it relies on a form of perfect competition
between atomistic miners. Unfortunately, this perfect competition is
not a stable equilibrium, because the atomistic miners have an incen-
tive to collude, or at least to merge.
The Incentive to Merge
Suppose that one bitcoin is to be mined over the next 10 minutes.
Now consider any two miners: If they work separately, each gets a
certain expected return and there is a certain probability of it success-
fully mining the bitcoin in the next block. If they merge their opera-
tions into a mining pool, they have the same expected return per
miner but a higher probability of obtaining that return.
Assume that there are n independent miners, each of whom faces
a probability p of mining the next bitcoin. For any individual miner,
the expected return from mining the next block is p bitcoin, since he
has a probability p of a return of 1 bitcoin. Now suppose that two
miners form a pool. The mining pool’s expected return is now 2p bit-
coin, because it has a probability 2p of mining the next bitcoin. The
expected return for each pool member is therefore p bitcoin. So by
joining the pool, the individual miner gets the same expected return
as it would get if it mined on its own, but it doubles its probability of
getting a positive return. Assuming miners are risk-averse, it then
makes sense for any two miners to pool their resources and share the
profits.
However, if it makes sense for any two miners to form a pool, it
also makes sense for any group of miners to form a pool. Thus, the
original competition between individual miners in the Bitcoin system
consolidates into competition between ever growing mining pools:
perfect competition gives way to oligopoly.
Now suppose that the process of consolidation has produced four
mining pools of equal size. Then each pool gets an expected return of
0.25 bitcoin because the probability that any one pool successfully
mines the next bitcoin is 0.25. Each of the p/4 pool members then has
an expected return of p bitcoin, being a 0.25 chance of a 4p return.
The original individual miners are clearly better off in the bigger pools
than they were operating independently, or even in smaller pools.
365
Bitcoin Will Bite the Dust
But the best outcome is simply for all the remaining pools to
merge into one super pool. The expected return to that super
pool is 1 bitcoin and it would achieve that expected return with a
probability of 1. (This is an oversimplification because we ignore
the possibility of new entrants coming into the mining market,
but this is just a detail.) The expected return to each pool mem-
ber is again p bitcoin, which it achieves with a probability
approaching 1.
We then arrive at the conclusion that the production of bitcoin is
a natural monopoly, an industry in which it is technically more effi-
cient to have one producer rather than many. So even if there are a
large number of producers/miners to begin with, there will be eco-
nomic pressure on them to combine.
The Negative Externalities of Competitive Mining
There is also a second reason why bitcoin mining is a natural
monopoly: the negative externalities of competitive mining. The
expected marginal revenue for an individual miner increases with
the amount of CPU power it devotes to bitcoin mining, but the
difficulty of the problem it must solve (and hence the marginal
cost involved) increases with the amount of CPU power
expended across the entire network. The result is that individual
miners do not take into account the negative cost externalities
that their own activities impose on other miners. The competitive
equilibrium is where the expected marginal private benefit
(MPB) from mining is equal to the expected marginal private
cost (MPC) of mining, but since the latter is less than the mar-
ginal social cost (MSC) of mining, we get an equilibrium in which
excessive resources are devoted to mining-related activities. In
particular, there is excessive use of energy and excessive invest-
ment in computing resources.
There is also an externality on the benefit side as well. An increase
in mining activity will produce a positive expected MPB to the miner
concerned, but the marginal social benefit (MSB) must always be
zero, because the Bitcoin protocol dictates that there are only so
many bitcoins to be had. So even if the activity were costless, seeking
the private benefits of bitcoin mining is a zero sum game—that is,
one miner’s gain must be another miner’s loss. Moreover, from the
perspective of social efficiency: since the MSB is zero, the socially
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optimal MSC is the lowest possible, which is a far cry from what the
competitive mining equilibrium delivers.
Consider the evidence. The daily revenue to bitcoin miners since
January 2009 shows that this revenue was initially very low, with
occasional peaks, the biggest being just over $5 million in late 2013.
Miners’ revenue then fell erratically and was $1,331,071 as of
December 13, 2014, equivalent to $370 per bitcoin mined. The price
of bitcoin the same day was $349. The difference between the rev-
enue per bitcoin and the price of bitcoin reflects the average transac-
tion fee that day.8
We also need to consider the cost of production, and these have
risen enormously. In the very early days of bitcoin, a typical home PC
could mine hundreds of bitcoins a day, but by late 2014, PCs have
long since been obsolete for bitcoin mining, and a state of the art
mining computer, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC),
can expect to mine only fractions of a bitcoin a day. A key component
of the cost of bitcoin mining is the “hash rate”—that is, the number
of gigahashes (billions of hashes) calculated by the network each sec-
ond. In January 2010, the hash rate was 0.01 or 1 percent but is now
more than 300 million, increasing by a factor of more than 30 billion.
We also have to consider that as the rate of production of bitcoins
halved in November 2012, the hash rate per bitcoin actually mined
increased by a factor of over 60 billion, as of December 13, 2014.9
However, what matters from a cost perspective is not the hash rate
as such, but the cost of producing it, and this cost has been falling
sharply over time. A good rule of thumb here is Koomey’s Law,
which suggests that the amount of battery power needed to achieve
a fixed computing load has been halving about every 18 months since
the 1950s (Greene 2011). If we count five years since January 2010,
the amount of energy per hash will have fallen by a factor of between
4 and 5 over this period, and the cost-adjusted hash rate will then
have risen by a factor of around only 10 billion or so. This is, needless
to say, still an enormous rate of growth.
There is also the question of the profitability of bitcoin mining.
Some insight into this issue is provided by a recent study by Hass
McCook (2014). To start with, we need to keep in mind that the
8Downloaded from blockchain.info on December 13, 2014.
9Ibid.
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profitability of mining depends in part on the local cost of electrical
power and the cost/efficiency of the mining machine used, and these
vary considerably. He points out that the rate of increase of the diffi-
culty of the underlying computing problem, which is reflected in the
rate of increase of the hash rate, is typically between 10 and
20 percent a fortnight, implying that the useful life of most mining
equipment is only about 3 to 6months. Putting these points together,
he comes up with some ballpark figures. He suggests an average cap-
ital cost of $530 for each mined bitcoin, and a corresponding average
operational cost of about $67 per bitcoin, meaning a total cost per bit-
coin of just under $600. By a curious coincidence, this was about the
same as the price of a bitcoin at that time. Of course, we should keep
in mind that this is very much a ballpark average figure and there will
be considerable variation around it. However, if we give it some cre-
dence, we can say that by July 2014, the average profitability of bit-
coin mining had declined to the point of marginality. Since then, the
price of bitcoin has fallen by just over 40 percent, and the hash rate—
and presumably the cost of mining—have risen further. We can then
reasonably infer that most bitcoin mining is now unprofitable.
We should now expect to see miners exiting the field by letting
their computers become obsolete without replacing them. The CPU
power devoted to mining would then fall to the point where it
became profitable to resume mining again, and the cycle would
repeat itself. However, we should keep in mind that the profitability
of mining also depends on the price of bitcoin. If the price of bitcoin
increased, then currently unprofitable mining operations would
become profitable and more CPU power would be devoted to min-
ing again. However, if the price of bitcoin fell, currently profitable
operations would become unprofitable, and there would be further
downward pressure on mining CPU power. In that case, mining
capacity would keep falling until it reached the point where mining
again became profitable—or, alternatively, if the price of bitcoin kept
falling, mining capacity would fall indefinitely.
It is also insightful here to consider the incentives faced by a bit-
coin miner. For the sake of illustration, let’s take as given McCook’s
cost estimates just set out. If the price of bitcoin is higher than about
$600 and expected to remain so, then bitcoin mining is profitable.
We would then expect the miner not just to mine for bitcoin, but also
to mine on the maximum scale it can manage, investing all it can in
further mining. This incentive to scale up helps explain why mining
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capacity has expanded so much, and is a critical and destabilizing fea-
ture of bitcoin market dynamics. If the bitcoin price is below $600,
but expected to stay above $67, then it is no longer economic to con-
tinue investing in bitcoin mining, because the price obtained no
longer covers both the capital and operational costs involved.
However, the marginal costs of bitcoin mining are still covered, so
the miner will use existing capacity to continue mining, but will not
maintain that capacity. Mining capacity will then rapidly run down
and effectively disappear in six months or so. Lastly, if the price of
bitcoin were to fall below $67, then mining activity would no longer
cover even the operational costs, and the miner would stop mining
altogether.
Returning to our natural monopoly theme, it is plainly obvious that
the industry could reap considerable benefits if the major players
were able to form a cartel or unite into a single outfit. This outfit
could stop further investment in bitcoin computing and switch off
most of the existing mining computers. Thereafter, it would maintain
the blockchain using a much smaller number of computers—
perhaps just a couple of servers—expending much less CPU power.
The cost gains achieved in this way could then be shared around the
members as additional profit. The potential savings are considerable:
If we take McCook’s figures for July 2014, then most of the nearly
$600 mining cost for each bitcoin could be avoided. With 24 \ 6 \
25W 3,600 bitcoins currently being produced each day, there would
be a cost saving of the greater part of 3,600 \ $600 or just over
$2 million per day.
Implications of a Bitcoin Natural Monopoly
These tendencies to centralization are totally destructive of the
Bitcoin system. The central innovations of Bitcoin are distributed
trust and the absence of any single point of failure. The system has
worked because users could trust the network as a whole to main-
tain the integrity of the system, and so avoid the need to trust any
individual body such as a central manager; and the system could-
n’t be brought down, because it had no single point of failure.
However, this model only works so long as the network consists of
a sufficient number of competing mining entities. Once the indi-
vidual miners coalesce into a dominant player or a group of big
players that are able to form a cartel, then that dominant
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player/cartel has control over the system—it decides which trans-
actions are to be deemed valid, and which are not. We then have
to trust that entity not to abuse its position and are back to the trust
model, not a self-regulating one. That same entity also becomes a
point of failure for the system as a whole. In short, the fundamen-
tal contradiction in the Bitcoin system is that it requires mining to
be competitive, but it creates a mining market structure that is a
natural monopoly, and the two are incompatible because of the lat-
ter’s tendencies toward centralization.
Going back to our island of stone money, it is as if everyone woke
up one morning unable from that point on to remember who owned
which stones. However, one individual still claims that he can
remember and helpfully offers to remember for everyone else. One
wonders how well that would work.
In each case, we have a system that depends on collective mem-
ory to operate, so it is difficult, to say the least, to see how it could
survive the undermining of the collective memory on which it
depends—especially when there is no instantly credible replacement
to the original collective memory trust model that has just been
eviscerated.
There are also further casualties to the Bitcoin system. Once a
dominant player arises, it cannot possibly operate in a clandestine
fashion beyond the knowledge of law enforcement; it cannot operate
anonymously like Silk Road on a dark web browser and thumb its
nose at the government. If it cannot operate anonymously, then it
cannot escape regulation by the state and would have to submit to
whatever state law requires in terms of tracking individual users and
reporting results to legal authorities. The combination of the Bitcoin
system being controlled by a publicly known entity, the requirement
that that entity submit to the law, and evolving de-anonymization
technology would then be fatal for user anonymity.10 Users of bitcoin
10It often said that Bitcoin is anonymous, but the truth is that it is actually pseudon-
ymous and operates via user IDs. The anonymity (or otherwise) of Bitcoin then
depends on whether a user’s true identity can be inferred from these user IDs or
the blockchain record. Even back in 2011, Jeff Garzik, a member of the Bitcoin dev
team, was openly cautioning bitcoiners not to take Bitcoin anonymity for granted.
He warned that law enforcement could parse the transactions flow to track down
users in the same way that they can detect suspicious money flows. Recent studies
such as Merklejohn et al. (2013), Möser (2013), and Biryukov, Khovratovich, and
Pustogarov (2014) look at various ways in which anonymity can be broken and con-
firm that most bitcoin transactions are not truly anonymous (see also Nielsen 2013).
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could no longer operate on the basis of any assumed anonymity, and
those who unwisely carried on using bitcoin for illegal purposes
would soon fall foul of law enforcement. Anonymity on part of min-
ers or bitcoin users would then disappear. Indeed, the likelihood is
that the government would destroy anonymity at a stroke by requir-
ing that the bitcoin dominant player insist that any users of the net-
work openly register themselves by providing photo ID, Social
Security numbers, and proof of address in much the same way that
bank depositors are required to provide the same information to their
banks for anti–money laundering and similar purposes. The demand
for bitcoin to make any illicit transactions (e.g., to buy illegal drugs on
Silk Road and similar sites, or to move funds around illegally) would
then disappear.
One has to ask why users of bitcoin would rationally continue to
have any confidence in the Bitcoin system when it becomes apparent
that its key attractions—decentralized trust, no single point of failure,
and the possibility of using it for anonymous transactions—had all
been compromised. Remember also that the willingness of any indi-
vidual to accept bitcoin is entirely dependent on his or her confi-
dence that other people will continue to accept it. There is nothing
in the system to anchor the value of bitcoins because, unlike gold or
tulips, bitcoins have no alternative use value.
Nor is there any rational reason to trust in the dominant
player/cartel to behave itself. Trust comes from credible assur-
ances—it comes from credible precommitment, a willingness to post
performance bonds, and to submit to account—and there is no way
that a shadowy dominant mining pool can provide such assurances.
In any case, there is no reason to want to trust such an entity when
you can use safe and reputable systems such as PayPal or the better
banks.
The whole Bitcoin system then becomes a house of cards. There
is nothing within the system to maintain confidence in the system,
and anything—a scandal, a government or regulatory attack, or any
factor that triggers a loss of confidence—could lead to a run that
brings down the entire system. It is then rational to sell out before
that happens, and if enough individuals think this way, their expecta-
tions will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. There will be a stampede
for the exit; the price of bitcoin will drop to bitcoin’s intrinsic value,
zero; and the system will collapse.
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The Emergence of the Big Mining Pools
Indeed, it may not take the emergence of a monopolist to bring on
the crisis, but merely the emergence of a mining pool big enough to
threaten the system. If we look at the bitcoin mining market, we see
that mining pools have been growing rapidly and are already very
large. An idea of their size can be seen from the distribution of hash
rate power across the bigger mining pools. As of December 13, 2014,
Discus Fish had 25 percent of the hash rate distribution and
GHash.IO had 17 percent. The other bigger pools were somewhat
smaller, but 20 percent of the distribution is “unknown.”11 It is there-
fore conceivable that some of this unaccounted hash rate is due to the
other big players. Thus, the shares of the big players might be larger
than they seem to be. The distribution also moves around a reason-
able amount from day to day, so the data should be regarded as a
snapshot from a volatile motion picture. Nevertheless, it indicates
that some pools are now large enough to be a source of threat to the
system as a whole.
The most interesting of these mining pools is the secretive
GHash.IO. Its business model is based on zero fees and cloud hash-
ing, in which miners rent out hash power from its sister outfit,
CEX.IO, which supplies the hardware, hosting, and maintenance. Its
webpage offers instant payouts, zero fees, 24/7 support, and SMS
messaging. We are told that GHash was launched in July 2013, is
trusted by 300k users, and (with about one third of the network’s
hashing power) is already the largest mining pool in the Bitcoin com-
munity. However, the webpage offers no phone numbers, offers no
credible reassurances, and has no audited accounts that we know of.
It also says nothing about the people involved or where it is based,
although further investigation suggests that the person behind
GHash is one Jeffrey Smith. The photo on his Twitter page (Jeffrey
Smith@jeff_smith01) shows him as a gentleman in his early 20s wear-
ing a T-shirt, but even so, we still cannot be sure whether this is the
person behind GHash or Mr. Smith himself. In short, we have no
real idea who is behind the allegedly biggest mining pool in the
Bitcoin community. However, we can safely assume that he is prob-
ably not some latter day John Pierpont Morgan, the premier
11Downloaded from blockchain.info on December 13, 2014.
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financier of his age, operating out in the open, putting his consider-
able wealth and reputation on the line with each deal he makes and
even choosing to operate under unlimited liability to give his coun-
terparties credible reassurance.
Once mining pools reach a big enough size, there is a danger that
one of them will launch a 51 percent attack in which a mining pool
achieves 51 percent or more of the mining power on the network and
then uses this power for malicious ends that the system was designed
to prevent. It can keep all the mined bitcoins to itself, double-spend
bitcoins, selectively reject competing miners’ transactions, extort
high fees from those with large holdings by making certain addresses
unspendable, or launch a denial-of-service attack against the net-
work. Another threat is “selfish mining”—that is, a strategy in which
a pool
keeps its discovered blocks private, thereby intentionally
forking the chain. . . . Rational miners will preferentially join
selfish miners to reap the higher returns. . . . Such a selfish
mining pool will quickly grow to become a majority, at which
point the pool will be the only creator of blocks, the decen-
tralized nature of the currency will collapse, and a single
entity, the selfish pool manager, will control the system [Eyal
and Gün Sirer 2013b: 2].
The possibility of a selfish mining attack is also significant
because it proves that the Bitcoin system is not fully incentive
compatible. Eyal and Gün Sirer offer various fixes to this threat.
But even in their best-case scenario with their fixes in place, their
analysis shows that the system can be taken over by a mining pool
that has 33 percent of the network’s hash power. Even in their
best-case, we would need at least two-thirds of the miners to
remain honest, not 50 percent as is widely believed, for the system
to be safe—and without any fixes it is not safe at all. Their conclu-
sions are stark:
Bitcoin is broken. And not just superficially so, but funda-
mentally, at the core protocol level. We’re not talking about a
simple buffer overflow here, or even a badly designed API
that can be easily patched; instead, the problem is intrinsic to
the entire way Bitcoin works. All other cryptocurrencies and
schemes based on the same Bitcoin idea, including Litecoin,
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Namecoin, and any of the other few dozen Bitcoin-inspired
currencies, are broken as well. (Eyal and Gün Sirer 2013a)12
The Bitcoin community had long been aware of threats such as
51 percent attacks. However, the conventional view among experts
was that they were not as serious as they appeared to be. It would be
obvious from the blockchain that an attack was under way, an
attacker wouldn’t be able to get its proceeds out of the Bitcoin sys-
tem and there were various ways to deal with an attack in the unlikely
event it did occur (e.g., the Bitcoin dev team would fix the problem
or the community would pressure a miscreant to behave responsi-
bly). One commentator even went so far as to describe the threat of
a 51 percent attack as a boogeyman. The argument was also repeat-
edly made that it would not be in any pool’s own interest to achieve
a 51 percent position, not least because this would be to invite mutu-
ally assured destruction. Bitcoin insiders also pointed to the commu-
nity’s success in dealing with previous cases where a mining pool had
become uncomfortably large.
A case in point occurred in April 2013, when the mining pool BTC
Guild obtained a large portion of the network hashrate and provoked
concern over its market power. In response, BTC Guild adopted a
mitigation plan that saw its market share fall again. This solution
worked thanks to the commitment of those involved to the Bitcoin
“rules of the game” and their shared understanding of the dangers
posed by the emergence of large mining pools. When a pool became
too big not only would miners voluntarily leave the pools of their own
choice, but the mining pools themselves would voluntarily reverse
their own growth by raising fees and halting new registrations. A big
pool would then reduce in size and the threat would recede.
12It is important to stress that there are alt currencies that are not based on
Bitcoin-like mining protocols. One of these is Ripple, which ranks second to
Bitcoin in terms of market cap: it currently has just over 9 percent of the cryp-
tocurrency market share, as opposed to Bitcoin’s 84 percent. Ripple has a prem-
ined currency supply and validates blocks through a consensus system based on
trusted validators, not proof-of-work “mining” as under Bitcoin. Its protocol deters
collusion and the fact that validators are known entities deters any Sybil attack.
Another is BlackCoin, which ranks #24 in the cryptocurrency league with a mar-
ket share of 0.02 percent. In this system, validation is based on “proof-of-stake”: a
node that generates a block has to prove that it has access to a certain amount of
coins before being accepted by the network. Generating a block involves sending
coins to itself, which then proves the ownership and hence the stake in the system.
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However, arguments to the effect that no one would engage in
behavior that threatened the system, because everyone has a stake
in it, are based on simplistic assumptions about the self-interests of
the parties concerned. Take an individual miner or small mining
pool. It is often stated that such outfits will have a commitment to
the system and take a long-term view because of their investment
in mining equipment. Yet this argument overlooks the point that
ASICs have a useful lifetime of only months. Their only incentive
is to extract as much value as possible before their investment
becomes obsolete: this is not a long-term investment but its oppo-
site, pure short-termism. Competition between mining pools is
also a complicated affair with enormous scope for game-playing,
especially with the rapidly evolving technology involved. A big
player will also have market power, and we should expect that it
will use that power to its own advantage. Like a big bank or utility
company, it can practice price discrimination, it can exploit behav-
ioral traits in its customer base, and it can exploit customers with
deliberately complicated opaque charge regimes. A dominant
miner can also
engage in subtle attacks that are hard to detect. [One of these
is] Transaction Differentiation [in which a] 51 percent miner
can simply render certain Bitcoin addresses (what clients per-
ceive as “wallets”) either unspendable or highly deprioritized
unless a high mining fee is paid. This is tantamount to ran-
som. In effect, the miner would turn to the Winklevii, who
have large Bitcoin holdings, and say “my, my, my, nice fat
wallet you’ve got there, you’ll have to attach a 1 percent min-
ing fee if you want to ever spend those coins again” while
brandishing the virtual equivalent of a steel pipe [Eyal and
Gün Sirer 2014].13
13The Bitcoin system is also open to a large variety of other attacks. These include:
(1) block withholding attacks, in which a pool infiltrates another, but discards any
full proofs-of-work and provides only partial proofs-of-payment to its victim,
which is thus deceived into thinking that the attacker is doing effective mining;
the attacker is then rewarded for its apparent effort when in fact it never con-
tributes to the victim’s revenue stream (Eyal 2014); (2) DOS attacks on the most
important nodes in the network, which might seriously disrupt it; (3) side-chan-
nel attacks which exploit weaknesses in crypto security to extract information
about private keys and enable the attacker to steal bitcoins (see Benger et al.
2014); (4) any number of malware attacks; (5) the usual market manipulation tac-
tics; and, as noted elsewhere, (6) the threat of attack from governments.
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Then along came GHash.IO, which broke the mould in two dif-
ferent ways. First, it had an innovative business model that made it
very attractive to individual miners. Apart from the obvious attraction
of zero fees, cloud hashing and hosted mining meant that miners no
longer had to bear the inconvenience and risks of having their own
mining equipment. Not surprisingly, GHash’s market share then rose
rapidly and it very soon became the biggest mining pool. The second
distinctive feature of GHash was its attitude: it wasn’t prepared to
play by the rules of the game.
In January 2014, GHash.IO achieved 42 percent of the network’s
hash rate and there was renewed concern about the threat this posed
to the network. In response, GHash.IO reassured the community
that it would “take all necessary precautions to prevent reaching
51 percent of all hashing power” to maintain the stability of the net-
work.14 However, GHash pointedly refused to move from the zero
fee model and didn’t deliver on its promises to keep its market share
down. The issue then flared up again on June 15, 2014, when it was
reported that GHash had repeatedly contributed more than 51 per-
cent of the network’s hashing output for periods as long as 12 hours.
As Gün Sirer observed, “having a single entity in GHash’s position, of
holding 51 percent of the mining power, of being in a monopoly posi-
tion, of being able to launch any of these attacks at will, completely
violates the spirit and intent of Bitcoin as a currency.”15 The very next
day, June 16, GHash rushed out a statement to reassure everyone of
its continued commitment to the Bitcoin system:
Our investment, participation and highly motivated staff con-
firm it is our intention to help protect and grow the broad
acceptance of bitcoin and categorically in no way harm or
damage it. We never have and never will participate in any
51 percent attack or double spend against bitcoin.16
14These precautions included a mitigation plan that included allowing CEX.IO
customers to point their hashing power toward other mining pools besides
GHash. This was a non-solution if ever there was one: the hashing power so
diverted would still be under the control of GHash.io/CEX.io and its hashing
power would merely appear to diminish. Such a “solution” makes the underlying






This statement will, we believe, ultimately prove to be bitcoin’s death
knell. Bitcoin, the ultimate system designed to avoid the need for
trust, is now reduced to relying on trust in the dominant mining pool
not to attack it.
In mid-July, Bloomberg journalist Leonid Bershidsky (2014)
wrote:
Trust will kill bitcoin, the stability of [Bitcoin] and all the infra-
structure that has grown around it in the past five years . . . now
depends on the goodwill of a few people whose names nobody
knows. “Jeffrey Smith”—the name used by GHash.IO’s only
spokesman—is likely a pseudonym.
There’s no guarantee that a certain group of people
doesn’t control more than 51 percent of Bitcoin emission
even now: GHash.io is currently 39 percent, but another
17 percent is ascribed to “unknown” by Blockchain.info, the
best source on mining pool shares. . . .
I’m not willing . . . to ignore the risk that a group of peo-
ple who won’t even tell me who they are might take the
money and run.
Trusting them would be akin to acknowledging them as
the system’s central bank, something Nakamoto emphatically
didn’t want it to have. Paradoxically, it’s easier to trust central
banks that print fiat money, because the people in charge and
their interests and motives are more or less known, or at least
are the subject of much study and speculation.
However, the problem wasn’t just that GHash.IO was now placed
to compromise the system, again. Part of the problem was its atti-
tude. It still claimed to share the community’s concern that mining
should be decentralized, but it had done nothing to promote decen-
tralization despite its earlier promises to scale itself back. It contin-
ued to refuse to raise its fees: higher fees were only a “temporary”
solution and GHash.IO was looking for something more permanent,
it said. It then painted itself as the victim: “You cannot blame
GHash.IO for being the #1 mining pool,” Smith told an interviewer,
as if it being the #1 pool had been outside of its control. It had
blatantly gone past the 51 percent barrier knowing very well its psy-
chological impact: it was openly flaunting its power and didn’t seem
to care what the others thought. It then declared its intention to host
a round table with the other leading pools and the Bitcoin
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Foundation to find ways to decentralize the mining industry, simul-
taneously declaring its adamant opposition to the traditional solutions
of high-level Bitcoin idealism—that is, self-restraint, to which the
other mining pools (apparently) still adhered.
Yet the underlying problem is not GHash’s attitude or any secret
agenda, or the fact that the community lacks an effective means of
bringing “offenders” under control.17 Instead, the problem is that
many of the proposed solutions to the problems posed by large min-
ing pools are not incentive-compatible.
One such “solution” is to suggest that individual miners would (or
should) behave responsibly because of their stake in the system. After
the GHash.IO threat surfaced in January 2014, one commentator
issued a stark statement:
This is a WARNING to all Bitcoin Miners. We sincerely
request that miners using GHash.io . . . leave the pool for
other smaller pools to create a more decentralized Bitcoin
hash distribution.
From the perspective of the community, it would have been a
good thing for individual miners to heed this warning and switch
away from GHash.IO. But why should they? Yes, very large mining
pools are antisocial, but why should any individual miner forgo his
own self-interest for the greater good? One has to bear in mind that
for an individual bitcoin miner, a big pool like GHash is an attrac-
tive proposition—it charges no fees, offers a fairly stable return
because of its size, and even takes away the hassle and risk of buy-
ing and maintaining one’s own ASIC miner. Why should such a
miner forgo those benefits when so many other miners are quite
happy to enjoy them? Again, one is left with only an appeal to put
conscience over self-interest. In any case, one can no longer assume
that individual miners even have much of a stake in the Bitcoin sys-
tem. In the past, there were major setup costs to mining, and most
17 Their only weapons are bad publicity, ostracism, and DoS attacks, all of which
have been tried on GHash.IO without much success. Bitcoiner critics are also
constrained in that they can’t be too aggressive in their criticisms without the risk
of undermining confidence in Bitcoin itself. The truth is that if one big player
refuses to play by the “rules of the game,” there is nothing much that the Bitcoin
community can do about it.
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miners had some commitment to the system, ideological as well as
intellectual. However, as mining has become mainstream and
much easier, you can now become a bitcoin miner without knowing
much about Bitcoin or even giving a damn about it: a friend tells
you that Bitcoin mining is a good prospect, so you take a few min-
utes to register at GHash, pay your money, and wait for the bitcoins
to roll in.
“Is this really Armageddon?” asked Eyal and Gün Sirer (2014).
“Yes, it is,” they answered. We agree. As they continued:
The fact is, this [GHash positioning itself to threaten the
network] is a monumental event. The Bitcoin narrative,
based on decentralization and distributed trust, is no more.
True, the Bitcoin economy is about as healthy as it was yes-
terday, and the Bitcoin price will likely remain afloat for a
while. But the Bitcoin economy and price are trailing indi-
cators. The core pillar of the Bitcoin value equation has
collapsed.18
Conclusion
The fact that the Bitcoin system was designed not to require
trust, but now depends on it, suggests that it is living on borrowed
time. Human nature being what it is, the temptation to abuse that
trust will prevail. The history of central banking is full of breaches
of such trust, and it would be perverse to assume that the big
18 We should add that Eyal and Gün Sirer themselves do not draw our conclusion
that bitcoin is doomed. Yes, it is Armageddon, they say, but they go on to state that
there is life after Armageddon and much of their work is devoted to suggesting fixes
of one sort or another that they claim would alleviate or solve some of the problems
posed by game-playing mining pools. We would claim that our conclusion is the
simplest and most natural one, however, and that their fixes, if adopted, would only
delay the inevitable and may not be adopted anyway. In fact, there has been a great
deal of discussion on the blogosphere about the large mining pool problem. Most
proposed solutions boil down to encouraging decentralization, a good example
being the “getblocktemplate” mining protocol developed over mid 2012, the
essence of which is to move block creation from the pool operator to the individual
miner. We cannot even attempt here to provide any analysis of these proposals,
other than to repeat our view that these are at best palliatives that may ameliorate
but do not root out the underlying problems posed by centralizing tendencies in the
Bitcoin system. We would also add that our message that Bitcoin will bite the dust
has received a mixed but mostly negative response from the Bitcoin community.
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bitcoin players would be immune to the same human failings as
central bankers.
Our best guess is that in the short term there will continue to be
a drip-by-drip erosion of confidence as the realization grows that the
system is compromised. The current bitcoin oligopoly cannot
resolve this problem: like the Roman triumvirates, it is unstable and
the principal parties involved cannot agree on a lasting solution; they
also lack the ability to provide the necessary credible assurances any-
way. Humpty is well and truly broken and neither all the King’s
horses nor all the King’s men can put him back together again: it can
only be a matter of time before the whole unsteady edifice will
collapse.19
Even in the unlikely event that it survives into themedium run, we
would still rate its longer-term chance of survival as zero. First, we
should remember that a recurring theme in the history of innovation
is that the pioneers rarely, if ever, survive. This is because early mod-
els are always flawed and later entrants are able to learn from the
mistakes of their predecessors. There is no reason why Bitcoin should
be an exception to this historical rule. The second reason is that in the
very long run bitcoin would be uncompetitive against efficient
closed-wall systems such as PayPal or COEPTIS, the successor to
e-gold. Once the production of bitcoins becomes insignificant, then
the Bitcoin system will entirely depend on transaction fees to cover
its operational costs, and its fee levels would be higher than those of
more traditional payment systems because of the need to maintain
excess hashing and excess capacity to deter new entrants into the
transaction validation business. Put differently, Bitcoin can never
achieve the technical economic efficiency of competitors that can
operate with a very small number of servers, or even just one. In the
very long term, when there are no new bitcoins being produced to
subsidize the validation process, the Bitcoin system will no longer be
19 Many of the alt cryptocurrencies have similar weaknesses to bitcoin. Lawrence
H. White (2015) documents that many of these have already collapsed, including
Terracoin, Freicoin, BBQCoin, Megacoin, Mooncoin, CryptCoin, ScotCoin,
Bitgem, and CrtCoin. Of these, Terracoin experienced a decline of 97 percent,
Megacoin experienced a decline of over 98 percent, and all the others mentioned
experienced declines of over 99 percent. This evidence suggests to us that
mining-based alt currencies have short life-spans and soon succumb to inherent
tendencies toward centralization, takeover, and collapse.
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able to compete.20 Last but not least, there is still the problem that
Bitcoin is not backed by anything.
Yet the undeniable achievement of Bitcoin is that it demonstrates
the practical possibility of fully decentralized monetary systems
based on the principle of distributed trust rather than central author-
ity. Like the Wright brothers, it shows that such systems can fly, but
it does not demonstrate that they can stay in the air for too long. We
would therefore regard Bitcoin as an instructive creative failure, but
we are hopeful that the lessons to be drawn from the experience of
Bitcoin and other crytpocurrencies will lead to superior private cur-
rencies in the future, crypto and otherwise. Further experimentation
in the private money space is therefore to be welcomed. As is the
nature of capitalist innovation, most of these experiments will doubt-
less fail, but a few will succeed—perhaps hybrids of crypto and gold.
As the old saying goes: “Make new friends, but keep the old. One is
silver and the other is gold.”
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